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What have been the trends in the distribution of income in advanced capitalist
countries over the last thirty years? The literature on economic inequality and aver-
age living standards has expanded dramatically in recent years and a number of
excellent surveys of the major issues1 document:
(1) The trend in many countries, since the mid 1970s, to increased inequality and
polarization of the earned income of men [Jenkins 1995; Gottschalk and Smeeding,
1997]. Although the same has often not been true for women, one might expect
such trends to produce greater inequality and poverty in family incomes after
taxes and transfer—but is this true and how general is this tendency?
(2) The fact that in a number of countries (for example, the United States and Canada),
the rapid rise in average hourly real wages of the early 1970s has been followed
by a quarter century of stagnation. However, trends in average income hide the
differing experiences of particular birth cohorts, and of different segments of the
income distribution. How general is the phenomenon of stagnation in living stan-
dards?
(3) Rising differentials in earnings between young and old workers, and an absolute
decline in the average real earnings of young workers, (especially those with
little education[Beaudry and Green, 2000]) has been combined with persistently
high youth unemployment in many countries. Concern with intergenerational
inequalities has increased, but how much of aggregate inequality is due to
intergenerational differences?
Even if average incomes are stagnant or falling and even if individuals retain the
same place in the hierarchy of cohort earnings, it is still possible for each individual to
experience, in their own lives, a rising material standard of living. Like a person
standing on an escalator that is slowly sinking into the sand, it is possible for an
individual to go up all their lives, even if the average is continually going down. As
long as the rate at which a cohort’s earnings go up with age is greater than the rate122 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
at which the average earnings of all age cohorts decline, they personally will be bet-
ter off over time.
As well, although there are many points of comparison in the income distribution
debate (for example, gender, region, race, and so on), a highly salient comparison for
most individuals is to compare themselves with other persons of approximately the
same age. Individuals who appraise their own economic well-being in terms of life-
time earnings may also be sanguine about age-related differences in income, (even if
such differentials influence the aggregate inequality of annual incomes) since they
may well expect to receive higher incomes as they age themselves. Sociologically,
age-related income differentials may also be subject to different norms of equity than
are applied to income differentials among those of the same age.
If all this is true, trends in income distribution among contemporaries may be
particularly important for subjective perceptions, and for the political implications of
inequality. Hence, although this paper presents estimates of the trend in distribution
and average level of equivalent income among all people, its main emphasis is on
following the fortunes of birth cohorts as they aged from approximately 1969/70 to
1994/95. Because the UK, the United States, Canada, Sweden and Germany have
been collecting micro data since the early 1970s and have made them available to the
Luxembourg Income Study, one can follow the fortunes of birth cohorts in these coun-
tries. Since the baby-boom cohort born 1946 to 1959 was 12 to 25 in 1971, 16-29 in
1975, 22-35 in 1981, 25-38 in 1984, 30-43 in 1989 and 35-48 in 1994, this paper follows
a “pseudo-cohort” methodology to identify the changing fortunes of birth cohorts.
Trends in the equivalent income of baby boomers are compared to trends in the
well-being of those born earlier—who can be labelled “golden agers” (born 1915 to
1929) or “ pre-boomers” (born 1930-1945). However, it is particularly interesting to
compare baby boomers to those born later—“generation X”, (born 1960-1975) and
“generation Y” (born in 1976 or after).
Clearly, in 1975 “generation X” were all younger than 16 years old. To estimate
their equivalent income as children one must make strong assumptions about the
distribution of resources within families. Estimates of the total effective resources
available to families also depend on the equivalence scale used to translate the total
income of families of different sizes into estimates of average economic well-being.
We therefore discuss methodology: the data sets used in this paper, the assumptions
underlying the computation of equivalent individual income, and the summary sta-
tistics of income distribution and poverty used. We continue by discussing the trends
from 1969/70 to 1994/95 in aggregate inequality and in average income and follow
the fortunes of the top ten percent and bottom twenty percent of birth cohorts. Finally
we discuss the possible implications of income inequality trends in Canada, the United
States, Germany, Sweden and the UK.
METHODOLOGY
Population
This paper uses Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) micro data to present point
estimates2 of income distribution trends over time for the following economies: Canada
(1971, 1975, 1981, 1987, 1991, and 1994), Germany (1981, 1984, 1989 and 1994),123 LONG RUN TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY
Sweden (1975, 1981, 1987, 1992 and 1995), United Kingdom (1969, 1974, 1979, 1986,
1991 and 1995), and the United States (1974, 1979, 1986, 1991, and 1994). The focus
is on the distribution of equivalent income among individuals, but the statistical start-
ing point is the LIS definition of total household money income after tax (disposable
income)3 as the basis for calculation of the “equivalent income” of all individuals within
households. Trends in equivalent income as distributed among all Canadians4, Ameri-
cans, Swedes, Germans, and Britons and among the members of five birth cohorts -
golden agers (born 1915 to 1929), pre-boomers (born 1930-1945), baby-boomers (born
1946-1959), generation X (born 1960-1975) and generation Y (born 1976 or later)5 are
considered. All summary statistics refer to the distribution of income among all na-
tional residents, as listed by LIS, excluding only those economic families or unat-
tached individuals who reported a zero or negative before-tax-money income. In all
cases, local currency figures for income have been converted to 1994 U.S. dollars
using the relevant country price deflator for consumer expenditure and the 1990 OECD
PPP estimates of purchasing power parity for consumption by households.6
Equivalent Income of Individuals
Estimates of the economic well-being of individuals within households depend
heavily upon the assumptions made about the degree and pattern of economic shar-
ing within households.7 As well, estimates of the total well-being of the household
depend upon the equivalence scale that is used to estimate the economies of scale in
household consumption.8 This paper uses the so-called LIS equivalence scale9 in which
the number of equivalent adults in each household is calculated as N0.5. The LIS equiva-
lence scale implies fairly large economies of scale in household consumption—the
second person in a household counts as 0.41, the third person receives a weight of
0.32 and a 4-person household is thought of as having the same relative level of con-
sumption needs as two unattached individuals (that is with the same total money
income, 2 adults living separately could live as well as the 4-person family living
together). This paper makes the assumption of equal sharing among all household
members, and calculates the equivalent income of each household member as equal
to the total money income of the household, divided by the number of equivalent
adults in the household. This equivalent income is assigned to all household mem-
bers, and the distribution of equivalent income across individuals is then calculated.
Summary Measures of Income Distribution
In Table 1, columns 1 and 2 report the mean and median equivalent individual
income. Although mean income is often used as a measure of trends in “average”
well-being, it can be heavily influenced by income changes among the very affluent
(who are very few in number)—the median is a more robust indicator of trends in
“typical” living standards. Column 3 reports the Gini index of income inequality,
which is the most popular summary statistic of inequality and is most sensitive to
changes in inequality in the mid-range of the distribution. Since the Theil index is
more sensitive to the bottom end, and also has the advantage of being additively
decomposable, it is presented in column 4.10 As an indicator of the extremes of the124 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
income distribution, column 7 shows the ratio between the average incomes of the
top 10 percent of persons and the average income of the bottom 10 percent, while
column 6 has the percentage of the population with equivalent income greater than
150 percent of the median. Together, column 6 and the poverty rate (percentage
below half the median equivalent income—column 5) have often been used as a guide
to the degree of “polarization” in living standards.
In international comparisons, a frequently used relativistic conception of poverty
draws the poverty line at one half the median national standard of living [Hagenaars,
1986, 1991; Osberg, 2000]. This paper takes the view that within each country social
norms of poverty may change over time, but at any point in time these norms (which
Smith [(1776)1961, 339] referred to as “those things which the established rules of
decency have rendered necessary to the lowest rank of people”) apply to all cohorts—
thus within each country the poverty line in real income terms is the same for all
TABLE 1
Inequality Across Countries
All Individuals - Equivalent Income (N0.5 Equivalence Scale)
Median  Mean Gini Theil   %<0.5  %>1.5 90/10 SST
Income Median Median Ratio Index
Canada 1971 12,083 13,286 0.315 0.168 16.0 21.0 10.13 0.103
1975 15,345 16,630 0.288 0.139 13.8 19.0 7.91 0.085
1981 16,691 18,232 0.283 0.133 12.3 19.8 7.21 0.072
1987 17,230 18,962 0.287 0.137 12.0 19.7 7.27 0.068
1991 17,389 19,267 0.284 0.137 11.4 20.1 7.04 0.063
1994 17,485 19,364 0.286 0.137 11.5 20.4 6.97 0.061
United States 1974 15,906 17,593 0.317 0.171 15.9 21.2 10.17 0.107
1979 17,092 18,640 0.303 0.151 15.9 21.4 8.96 0.102
1986 18,077 20,521 0.336 0.187 17.9 24.7 11.03 0.119
1991 17,715 20,172 0.340 0.190 17.9 24.7 11.14 0.117
1994 17,511 20,736 0.364 0.224 18.5 26.5 13.50 0.126
United Kingdom 1974 11,158 12,397 0.268 0.127 9.0 18.1 5.72 0.032
1979 11,773 12,954 0.268 0.119 9.0 19.3 5.67 0.038
1986 12,211 13,987 0.296 0.149 8.4 22.7 6.73 0.046
1991 14,175 16,805 0.338 0.210 14.5 25.0 8.70 0.064
1995 14,166 16,941 0.343 0.209 13.2 24.9 9.26 0.066
Sweden 1975 11,359 11,719 0.214 0.076 6.4 11.3 4.26 0.032
1981 11,440 11,872 0.196 0.065 5.2 10.4 3.88 0.030
1987 11,623 11,977 0.217 0.087 7.3 10.5 4.76 0.047
1992 13,508 14,295 0.228 0.091 6.5 13.1 4.99 0.045
1995 12,476 13,127 0.220 0.090 6.5 11.8 5.21 0.055
Germany 1981 13,159 14,497 0.245 0.102 5.6 16.6 4.97 0.029
1984 12,948 14,234 0.250 0.111 6.5 16.3 5.16 0.028
1989 14,417 15,849 0.248 0.114 5.6 16.3 5.29 0.035
1994 14,150 15,722 0.272 0.141 8.5 17.7 6.59 0.052
1994 + DDR 13,659 15,143 0.264 0.133 7.5 17.2 6.09 0.044
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birth cohorts in any given year. However, although the poverty rate is undoubtedly
the most commonly used measure of poverty, it does not reflect the amount by which
the incomes of the poor fall below the poverty line and it ignores the degree of in-
equality among the poor. For these reasons, column 8 presents the Sen-Shorrocks-
Thon (SST) index of poverty intensity, which can be calculated [Osberg and Xu, 2000] as:
(1) P(Y; z) = (RATE) (GAP) (1+G(X)),
where RATE is the poverty rate, and GAP is the average poverty gap ratio among the
poor. Since (1+G(X)) is in practice nearly constant over time and across countries
[Osberg, 2000, 852] the SST index is roughly proportional to the expected poverty gap
of a randomly selected individual (that is the crude probability of poverty multiplied
by the expectation of the poverty gap, conditional on being poor).
Demographic Change and Trends in Equivalent Income
In the quarter century leading up to 1994/95, social institutions in developed
countries changed substantially, one sign of which is a reduction in the average size
of households (in Canada, from 2.86 in 1971 to 2.51 in 1994 ). Even if average real
money income per family were constant, the fact that a given income is shared among
fewer individuals within families could be expected to increase average effective in-
come—and the effect is appreciable in some countries. Using the LIS scale, a decline
from 2.86 members to 2.51 would (holding family money income constant) raise equiva-
lent income by about 6.7 percent—and since this average change is in fact the result
of unequal changes at different points in the distribution, demographic change is
likely to affect the distribution of effective income as well.
Although for society as a whole the average size of economic families changes
rather slowly, change in the family circumstances of individuals as they progress
through the life cycle is much more dramatic. Because substantial changes in family
size are associated with predictable events (such as “growing up and leaving home”),
cohort comparisons are likely to be severely misleading if they are based on either
individual income or total family income. In some cohorts, the quarter century to
1994 saw particularly large changes in family size—for example in Canada, the aver-
age family size of golden agers (born before 1930) fell from 3.6 to 1.95 from 1971 to
1994. Although their average family money income fell by some 19 percent (after
inflation), it was shared by far fewer people—the magnitude of the decline in their
average family size implied that average real equivalent income rose by 70 percent.11
For both the youth cohort who are leaving the parental home to set up new house-
holds and seniors (who often suffer the death of a spouse), change in family size is
particularly large, and the adjustment for economies of scale in household consump-
tion is particularly important.
Trends in the United States, the UK, Sweden, Germany and Canada
The major message of Table 1 has been expressed before by others, but neverthe-
less deserves repeating. As Atkinson has said: “There is considerable diversity of126 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
national experience with regard to the distributions of income and earnings; it is
misleading to talk of a general “trend” toward increased dispersion”[1998, 11].
Looking first at the poverty rate—the percentage of the population with incomes
below half the median (column 5)—one can find in Table 1 a trend to a decreasing
poverty rate (Canada), substantially increasing poverty rate (the United States and
UK), somewhat increasing poverty rate (Germany)12 and stable poverty rate (Swe-
den). However, as already noted, the poverty rate is not a particularly good index of
poverty. The SST index (column 8) builds into the measurement of poverty a consid-
eration of the average poverty gap ratio (and the inequality of poverty gaps), and the
picture it paints is a bit more complex. Measured by the SST index, Canada still has
a substantial decline in poverty up to 1994, albeit from a relatively high initial level.
The the United States has both a high initial level, and a substantial increase, in
poverty intensity after 1979 while the UK has an even larger increase in poverty
intensity, but started from a lower initial base and therefore ends up at a level com-
parable to Canada’s. In both the United States and the UK, the trend to greater
poverty intensity is steady from the early 1980s on and comes from both an increased
rate and an increased average poverty gap. Alternatively, although Sweden had a
fairly steady poverty rate for the period as a whole, it had an overall increase in
poverty intensity, because the average poverty gap widened.
The overall picture for polarization is just as nationally nuanced. In Canada,
Sweden and Germany, the percentage of people above 150 percent of the median
income was nearly constant. Hence, if “polarization” is measured by the total percent-
age of the population with a standard of living outside the band 0.5 to 1.5 the median
income, all the change in polarization in those countries was due to the changing
percentage below half the median income—that is, the changes in the poverty rate
(which moved down in Canada, slightly up in Germany and remained flat in Swe-
den). In the United States and UK, on the other hand, substantial increases were
observed in both the fraction of the population below half the median income and
above 150 percent of the median—so polarization increased at both ends of the in-
come distribution, and increased substantially.
This paper looks at income from the perspective of the consumption possibilities
it enables, so inequality in after-tax, after-transfer household equivalent income is
the appropriate concept. As measured by either the Gini or Theil indices, income
inequality declined in the 1970s in all five countries and obeyed no consistent trend
across countries after 1980. The Canadian data are marked by an initial decline in
inequality in the early 1970s which continued slightly in the late 1970s, but the 1981
to 1994 data for Canada is essentially flat. Inequality in the United States and UK
also fell from 1974 to 1979, but both countries show a strong trend to greater inequal-
ity from 1979 to 1994/95. In Sweden, inequality fell from 1975 to 1981 before rising
through 1992 and falling slightly in 1995. German data from 1981 to 1994 (if one
looks only at the former West German states) show an upward trend in inequality.
The only consistent part of the story is the decline in income inequality observed in all
five countries in the l970s13—after which a variety of trends are to be observed.
In the popular press, one often hears reference to differences between the “typi-
cal” outcomes of different generations and some economists [Kotlikoff, 1992] have127 LONG RUN TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY
emphasized the idea of “generational accounting” and the study of intergenerational
differences (for a contrary view, see Osberg [1998]). Since this paper will discuss
differences in the experiences of different birth cohorts, there may be a tendency to
overemphasize the relative importance of differences between generations in average
incomes, compared to the differences in individual incomes within generations. Table
2 is intended to be an antidote to any such tendencies. It uses the additive decompo-
sition property of the Theil index of inequality14 to present the percentage of aggre-
gate inequality (column 4 of Table 1) that can be explained as arising from intra-
cohort inequality. The remainder of aggregate inequality (less than 11 percent for all
five countries) can be ascribed to the differences between generations in average
incomes, but the point of Table 2 is to emphasize that it is differences among indi-
viduals of approximately the same age that dominates the extent of inequality in all
countries.
Table 3 therefore follows the fortunes of three cohorts—pre-boomers, boomers
and generation X—as they age. Notably, the trend in median income of particular
cohorts may not be predicted particularly well by median income of the entire popula-
tion. In the United States, for example, from 1986 to 1994 the median income of all
persons fell by about 3.1 percent (from $18,077 to $17,511), but the baby boomers
were moving into their peak earnings years and their median income rose by 11.7
percent (from $19,187 to $ 21,430). Over this period, declines in median income were
concentrated in the cohorts younger and older than the boomers. Divergence in co-
hort experience is often seen in other countries as well—for example in the UK from
1991 to 1995, when boomer median incomes rose, while pre-boomers and generation
X saw a decline or in Canada where pre-boomer median incomes fell from 1987 to
1994 while boomers and generation X saw a median income increase.
Either between cohorts in the same country or across countries, movements of
median income diverge considerably. Hence it is hard to generalize about whether
the typical earnings of a birth cohort grew or fell—but there is a common trend of
rising inequality within cohorts (as measured by the Gini index) after about 1980. In
some countries, the trend begins in the 1970s and across countries it differs in magni-
TABLE 2
Inequality in Equivalent Income
Percentage of Total Inequality Arising from within Cohort Differences in
Income Using the Theil Index
1995 1994 1981 1979
Canada  — 96.3 91.9  —
United States  — 93.9  — 90.1
United Kingdom 94.9  —  — 89.0
Sweden 91.6 — 93.8  —
Germany —- 96.5 90.7  —
Each cell entry = (g((ngYg)/(nY))Rg)/R,where Rg is the cohort Theil index; R  is the Theil index for all
individuals; ng  is number in cohort g; n  is total population; Yg  is average income of gth cohort; Y  is
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tude—but it can be observed in all five nations. It is this combination of rising intra-
cohort inequality and divergent trends in median cohort income (and associated in-
ter-cohort inequality) that explains the divergence of aggregate inequality trends.
However, what do these trends mean for actual living standards? Since percent-
age shares may be harder to visualize than money incomes, Table 4 presents the
average income, in 1994 U.S. dollars, of individuals in each decile of the distribution
of equivalent income in the mid 1990s. Readers who are looking for their own income
in Table 4 should remember to convert household income into equivalent individual
income (for example a four person family with an $84,000 income after tax and trans-
fers would all be in Canada’s top decile). One must also caution that Table 4 captures
only the money income of households, and ignores the time that households devote to
earning that income. The five countries examined here differ dramatically in the
TABLE 3
Trends in Intra-Generational Income Distribution
 Pre-Boomers  Baby Boomers  Generation X
Ages Median Gini Ages Median Gini Ages Median Gini
Canada
1971 26-41 13,038 0.286 12-25 11,535 0.302 0-11 11,112 0.287
1975 30-45 16,559 0.263 16-29 15,440 0.253 0-15 14,151 0.268
1981 36-51 19,336 0.265 22-35 16,917 0.262 6-21 15,174 0.271
1987 42-57 20,474 0.283 28-41 18,033 0.268 12-27 17,503 0.283
1991 46-61 21,267 0.288 32-45 18,329 0.273 16-31 17,980 0.281
1994 49-64 19,857 0.300 35-48 19,269 0.274 19-34 18,165 0.285
United States
1974 29-44 17,471 0.288 15-28 16,317 0.303 0-14 14,159 0.298
1979 34-49 20,015 0.271 20-33 17,259 0.279 4-19 15,114 0.295
1986 41-56 23,008 0.311 27-40 19,187 0.310 11-26 17,425 0.332
1991 46-61 23,066 0.326 32-45 20,023 0.314 16-31 17,270 0.331
1994 49-64 22,665 0.355 35-48 21,340 0.335 19-34 16,869 0.356
United Kingdom
1974 29-44 11,704 0.245 15-28 12,680 0.245 0-14 10,162 0.232
1979 34-49 13,408 0.248 20-33 13,119 0.255 4-19 11,822 0.243
1986 41-56 15,258 0.282 27-40 13,104 0.302 11-26 13,944 0.278
1991 46-61 17,111 0.349 32-45 16,106 0.314 16-31 16,713 0.309
1995 50-65 15,640 0.331 36-49 17,313 0.331 20-35 15,663 0.341
Sweden
1975 30-45 12,672 0.184 16-29 11,450 0.223 0-15 11,672 0.169
1981 36-51 12,983 0.190 22-35 12,019 0.169 6-21 11,180 0.209
1987 42-57 14,200 0.202 28-41 12,390 0.187 12-27 10,933 0.244
1992 47-62 17,400 0.210 33-46 15,023 0.196 17-32 12,148 0.253
1995 50-65 14,902 0.213 36-49 13,818 0.194 20-35 11,547 0.223
Germany
1981 36-51 14,727 0.220 22-35 13,363 0.230 6-21 12,279 0.216
1984 39-54 14,893 0.227 25-38 12,560 0.249 9-24 13,009 0.236
1989 44-59 16,805 0.238 30-43 15,244 0.242 14-29 14,830 0.246
1994 49-64 16,160 0.286 35-48 15,369 0.265 19-34 14,405 0.254
1994 + DDR 49-64 15,310 0.281 35-48 14,943 0.261 19-34 13,815 0.251
Using After-Tax Equivalent Income - N.5 Equivalence Scale: All dollars in US 1994 (OECD PPP)129 LONG RUN TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY
annual number of work hours per adult aged 15 to 64—in 1994, the United States
had the highest average hours (1,384.6), followed by Canada (1,187.3), the UK
(1,182.8), Sweden (1173.1), and Germany (992.3).15 Furthermore, trends over time
have differed substantially—between 1980 and 1994 annual working hours per adult
rose by 159.8 hours in the United States, and 25.9 hours in Sweden, but fell by 162.4
hours in Germany, 31.3 hours in Canada and 70.1 hours in the UK. As well, both the
“social wage” of public services that individuals receive from government and the
value of implicit income from home ownership and the services of consumer durables
owned by households are not captured in Table 4.
Nevertheless, for some purposes, these omissions accentuate the implications of
Table 4. In money income terms, Americans in the bottom decile of the income distri-
bution are absolutely worse off than those in the bottom decile in any of the other four
countries, while the top decile is significantly better off than anywhere else. Although
the top decile of UK residents is second only to the top U.S. decile in average income,
the bottom forty percent of the UK have less income than the bottom two quintiles
anywhere else. However, Canadians in the bottom half of the income distribution
have a higher income than comparable people anywhere else.
But do absolute income levels matter much?
For most of the income distribution, it may be relative income or trends over time
that are more important. Although the top decile of the income distribution may travel
internationally with sufficient frequency to make comparisons of absolute standards
of living, and perhaps become envious of lifestyles elsewhere, most other people have
little direct observation of the income available to their peers in other countries. In
political terms, invidious international comparisons among the affluent of absolute
living standards elsewhere may be very important, but, for most of the income distri-
bution, the relevant issue is whether income lives up to expectations. The relevant
comparison of current incomes is to actual experience in the past (which likely domi-
nates expectations for the future). Table 5 therefore presents the change over time in
the average income of decile groups in the distribution of equivalent income.
 If individuals change their rank in the income distribution, these deciles of the
income distribution will consist of different persons, but if one wants to assess trends
in inequality, the issue is whether income mobility within cohorts has increased or
decreased over time. In the United States, Mishel et al. conclude that: “the rate of
mobility appears to have declined since the late 1960s” [1999, 89]. Dickens’ conclu-
TABLE 4
Average Equivalent After Tax Income for All Individuals in 1994 US$
by Decile (N0.5 Equivalence Scale)
Decile  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
Canada 94 6003 9720 12,074 14,232 16,417 18,608 21,231 24,450 29,065 41,846
United States 94 3972 7725 10,512 13,201 16,019 19,144 22,675 27,047 33,457 53,610
UK 95 4731 7374 8976 10,876 13,000 15,318 18,002 21,216 26,065 43,826
Sweden 95 4736 8518 9955 11,014 11,961 12,993 14,086 15,548 17,778 24,665
Germany 94 5225 8693 10,419 11,914 13,398 14,949 16,689 19,069 22,394 34,420130 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE 5
Annual Percentage Change in Mean Equivalent Income by Decile
Decile Canada US UK Sweden Germany
81/94 79/94 79/95 81/95 81/94
All 1 0.97 0.77 0.01 0.64 0.88
2 0.59 0.44 0.58 0.60 0.15
3 0.34 0.37 0.53 0.72 0.39
4 0.30 0.24 0.77 0.71 0.50
5 0.38 0.00 1.09 0.64 0.59
6 0.37 0.30 1.39 0.63 0.54
7 0.41 0.51 1.67 0.56 0.50
8 0.43 0.76 1.87 0.64 0.64
9 0.44 1.06 2.27 0.73 0.78
10 0.68 2.21 3.95 1.58 1.34
Gen. X 1 1.96 0.27 0.28 0.02 2.03
2 1.25 0.34 0.09 0.02 0.27
3 1.11 0.50 0.69 0.08 0.52
4 1.17 0.47 1.35 0.16 0.85
5 1.43 0.60 1.79 0.22 1.20
6 1.63 0.92 2.24 0.31 1.45
7 1.84 1.27 2.64 0.35 1.60
8 1.91 1.59 3.06 0.39 1.83
9 1.96 1.95 3.48 0.37 1.68
10 1.93 3.17 5.21 0.69 1.06
Boomers 1 1.33 0.14 0.11 0.93 0.13
2 0.95 0.59 0.47 0.91 0.73
3 0.93 0.88 1.18 0.93 1.02
4 1.02 1.16 1.70 1.06 1.21
5 1.03 1.44 1.90 1.09 1.25
6 1.10 1.66 2.06 1.04 1.10
7 1.14 1.78 2.09 1.12 1.00
8 1.21 1.98 2.28 1.27 1.12
9 1.23 2.32 2.72 1.41 1.76
10 1.68 3.61 4.78 2.37 2.62
Pre- 1 0.98 0.99 0.09 1.57 1.16
Boomers 2 0.86 0.35 0.09 1.15 0.17
3 0.42 0.02 0.27 0.99 0.41
4 0.05 0.39 0.50 1.03 0.74
5 0.11 0.75 0.91 1.04 0.72
6 0.26 1.08 1.17 1.13 0.74
7 0.27 1.43 1.39 1.26 1.05
8 0.40 1.79 1.60 1.22 1.16
9 0.59 2.27 2.05 1.35 1.66
10 0.98 3.90 4.00 2.57 3.26
Golden 1 4.13 0.57 1.16 0.86 0.35
Agers 2 0.71 1.12 0.00 0.24 0.02
3 0.67 1.52 0.65 0.36 0.06
4 1.35 1.56 1.05 0.51 0.22
5 1.73 1.55 1.22 0.74 0.66
6 1.79 1.49 1.22 0.90 0.78
7 1.78 1.32 1.16 0.97 0.79
8 1.66 1.12 0.90 1.04 0.68
9 1.50 0.68 0.52 0.92 0.38
10 0.83 1.02 0.77 0.26 0.43131 LONG RUN TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY
sion for the UK is similar: “earnings mobility has fallen since the late 1970s” [1999,
223]. Alternatively, Baker and Solon [1998] use income tax data to conclude that the
year to year instability of income in Canada has risen from 1975 to 1993. Since trends
in the average income of income deciles represent shifts in the pattern of ultimate
economic rewards across individuals given the degree of individual mobility from
year to year, and since there is some evidence of decreased mobility in the two coun-
tries that have demonstrated the greatest increase in income inequality, these trends
in inequality of outcomes may understate tendencies to greater inequality of oppor-
tunity.
Table 5 summarizes the different long-term experience of deciles of the income
distribution. It presents the average annual percentage change in the mean equiva-
lent income of each decile of the income distribution, over the period 1980 to 1995
(approximately) when the trend to greater equality of the 1970s may have been re-
versed.
Since the data sets contained in LIS in fact have dates that do not align exactly,
the overall change in income has been annualized, as an arithmetic average of total
percentage change. This procedure has the advantage of allowing each country to be
directly compared but the disadvantage of not fully conveying the cumulative impact
of differential rates of growth of income. Over the sixteen-year period 1979 to 1995
the incomes of the top decile of UK baby boomers grew by 76.5 percent, and the top
decile of UK generation X enjoyed an 83.3 percent increase in average income. Gains
at the top of the United States income distribution were large (at 54.1 percent for
boomers and 47.6 percent for Xers), but not nearly as large— and no other country
comes close to matching the cumulative gains of the top decile of the United States
and the UK.
From 1980 to 1995, the cohort born between 1914 and 1929 aged from being 51 to
66 to being 66 to 81. Although most “golden agers” were in the paid labor force in
1980, almost all had retired by 1995. As earnings were replaced by pensions, the
money incomes of most deciles of the income distribution in all countries fell. How-
ever, the structure of the income support system for the elderly matters a lot. In some
countries (especially Canada) the presence of a floor to old age security benefits which
is higher than social assistance for the non-elderly has meant that the poorest decile
are actually better off in their retirement years than in their working years.16
Countries differ in the extent to which the old age security system emphasizes
earnings-related pensions over flat rate, needs-based benefits. In the United States,
there are broadly similar declines in the income of all but the poorest and richest
deciles, as the Social Security system replicates for the pensions of the retired much
of the inequality in earnings which they experienced as workers. This tendency is less
marked in other countries. In both Canada and the UK the bottom quintile was better
off in retirement than during their working years. Despite much media comment in
the United States on the affluence of the elderly, it is notable that the decline in
income of the cohort moving into retirement is significantly larger in the United States
than it is for most other countries.
The difference between the experience of cohorts as they enter retirement and as
they progress through their working years is worth emphasizing because it can shape
overall perceptions of income trends. The top panel of Table 5 indicates that among132 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
all Americans, the bottom half of the income distribution was better off, in real equiva-
lent money income, in 1979 than in 1994. Overall, the average income of Americans
rose by 11.2 percent, but all the gains in income of this 15-year period (and then
some) were concentrated in the top half of the income distribution. Cumulatively,
over this 15-year period the bottom decile had an income drop of 11.62 percent but
the top quintile averaged a 24.6 percent increase and the top decile had an income
gain of 33.2 percent.
However, declines in average income are not generally found in the lived experi-
ence of birth cohorts. As the bottom panels of Table 5 indicate, most deciles of each
cohort of Americans experienced some increase in equivalent income over the period
as a whole. The poorest decile of generation X had a small (cumulatively equal to 4.1
percent) decline in real income, as did the poorest quintile of pre-boomers, (which
may be due to labor market entry among the former and early retirement among the
latter) but in no other case is an actual decline in income observed. Hence, although
Americans may be disappointed with their average rate of income increase, within
each cohort’s working life the within-cohort distribution of income has in general
been moving up slightly in real terms.
However, it is a slightly different issue to ask if people are as well off as their
parents were at a comparable age. Although Table 5 presents the cumulative per-
centage gains or losses of each decile, it does not enable one to compare the absolute
income of cohorts, or the evolution over time of their income. For this, we turn to
graphical methods. Figures 1a and 1b follow the fortunes of the poorest quintile of
each country as cohorts have aged over the quarter century leading up to 1994/95 and
Figures 2a and 2b present comparable data for the top ten percent. In each case,
average incomes have been converted to 1994 U.S. dollars using the OECD Purchas-
ing Power Parity ratios for consumer expenditure. Age is calculated as the mid-point
of each cohort’s ages, at each point of observation.
One way of using these figures is to answer the question: “Have the poorest and
richest of each generation experienced, in their own lives, an increasing or decreasing
absolute standard of living?” During this 25-year period, the birth cohorts overlap for
about ten years, so a second way of looking at the data is as an answer to the question:
“Am I better off, or worse off, than people like me were at the same age, in the previ-
ous generation?” The answer to both questions is likely to be important for percep-
tions of whether there is “progress” in living standards.
For Canada, Figure 1a indicates that the poorest quintile of Canadians in each
cohort are generally better off over time (with the sole exception of the pre-boomer
cohort in their late forties), and significantly better off than the previous cohort at
the same age. Figure 1b indicates that the same is true, with the exception of the
1960-1975 cohort, in Sweden. However, the same is not true for the poorest twenty
percent of Americans and Britons. Whatever benefits twenty five years of growth
have brought to the affluent of the United States and UK, the bottom part of the
income distribution has not shared in that growth. With one exception, each cohort of
the poor has received a lower income than the previous cohort at the same age, and
has ended the period with essentially the same, or a lower, real income than when it

















































































who experienced some increase in average equivalent income as they aged (although
still ending with less real income than the earlier cohort at the same age).
As Figure 2a illustrates, the incomes of the top ten percent of each Canadian
cohort have risen over time, and relative to the income of earlier cohorts at the same
age. The1914-1929 cohort experienced a drop in their income with retirement and the
income profile of the 1930-1945 cohort is one of the few age/income profiles to have
the nice quadratic shape so beloved in labor economics texts. However, if affluent
Canadians looked only to their own history, or that of the previous generation, they
would have grounds for quiet satisfaction.
FIGURE 1a
Mean Equivalent After-Tax Income (Bottom Quintile)
Canada and the United States
FIGURE 1b
Mean Equivalent After-Tax Income (Bottom Quintile)
UK and Sweden
Generation X(born 1960–75) = X; boomers (born 1946–59)=B;
pre-boomers (born 1930–45)=PB; golden agers (born 1915–29)=GA;
Canada=C, United States = US; United Kingdom=UK; Sweden=S.134 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
However, affluent Canadians have only to look south of the border to find grounds
for envy. The top decile of each cohort of Americans has done much better than their
counterparts in Canada—both relative to their initial incomes and relative to earlier
cohorts. And envy only intensifies if affluent Canadians should compare themselves
to the top decile of Britons (Figure 2b), whose income increase has been truly spec-
tacular. To the extent that Canadian elites live in the cultural periphery of the United








































































Mean Equivalent After-Tax Income (Top Decile)
Canada and the United States
FIGURE 2b
Mean Equivalent After-Tax Income (Top Decile)
UK and Sweden
Generation X(born 1960–75) = X; boomers (born 1946–59)=B; pre-
boomers (born 1930–45)=PB; golden agers (born 1915–29)=GA;
Canada=C, United States = US; United Kingdom=UK; Sweden=S.135 LONG RUN TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY
than their own actual experiences might warrant—while American and British elites
have no grounds for dissatisfaction at all.
As Figure 2b also indicates, the average money incomes of the top decile of Swedes
shows even less increase over time than the Canadian data, either over the life course
of particular cohorts or compared to the earlier cohort.17 All cohorts have experienced
a real income decline in the 1990s. One wonders whether such trends will produce
discontent, and of what variety.
CAVEATS AND CONCLUSIONS
Although the calculation of equivalent income represents an important improve-
ment over average money income per household, or the distribution of per capita
income, the average equivalent income of each household member is not a full mea-
sure of economic well-being. Among the issues this paper has, for reasons of space,
ignored are inequalities within the family, the possible endogeneity of household size
to trends in equivalent income, the imputed rent and capital gains arising from home
ownership, the opportunity cost of the time supplied by households to the paid labor
market in order to earn income, and the increase in economic insecurity, which has
been greatest among youth [Osberg, Erksoy, and Phipps, 1998].
In international comparisons, one must also add the “social wage” of public ser-
vices. Smeeding et al. conclude that “noncash income reinforces the redistributive
impact of conventional (cash) tax-transfer mechanisms rather than acting to offset
them in any major way”[1993, 229], so the qualitative conclusions of this paper on
inequality differences across countries are unlikely to be reversed. However, this
paper’s omission of the social wage means that comparisons of the absolute level of
money income between, for example, countries such as the United States and Sweden
are a misleading indicator of absolute levels of economic well-being.
Finally, one must note that this paper does stop at 1994/95. Since then, econo-
mies have changed. For example, in the late 1990s the United States enjoyed very
low unemployment, which had positive impacts on the earnings of the low paid, while
Canada has made major cuts to many of the transfer programmes for working age
adults that have mitigated poverty and inequality in the past (for an extended dis-
cussion, see Osberg, [2000]).
In the large literature on economic inequality that now exists, it is depressingly
common to observe such statements as: “what holds true for earnings holds true for
income as well” [Higgins and Williamson,1999, 6]. Based on such an assertion, the
author’s next step is usually to construct a highly simplified model of the labor mar-
ket and argue that a general trend to greater inequality is due to one (or perhaps
two) major inexorable causes—such as cohort size [ibid.], or “skill”-biased technologi-
cal change or globalization of trade. If such causal factors are arguably difficult to
affect by public policy, one may find the author urging the TINA— There Is No Alter-
native—position.
However, market forces always operate within an institutional context, and
changes in such institutions as minimum wages and unionization have been respon-
sible for a significant fraction of the rise in inequality of hourly wages observed in the136 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
United States [DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux,1996]. Furthermore, even if changing
market forces are driving part of the changes in the “price” of labor, it is the hourly
wages of individuals which are affected, and it is a long way from there to the distri-
bution of annual equivalent income.
 At any point in time, countries make choices about the institutional context of
the labor market and also about the macroeconomic demand management policies
that help determine how many people are working, and for how many hours per year.
There is substantial evidence that individuals cannot necessarily get all the hours of
work they desire at the going wage, and that demand-side constraints are particu-
larly important for the lower paid [Osberg and Phipps, 1993]. Trends in the inequal-
ity of hourly wages therefore have to be combined with trends in the determinants of
annual hours, before the inequality of individual earnings can be derived. Combined
with individual preferences, public choices on macroeconomic policy heavily influ-
ence the distinction between inequality of wages and inequality of earnings. Over
time, countries also make choices about their public investments in the education
and training of each generation of workers, which affect the structure of supply of
human capital, and choices about the industrial policy, which influences the struc-
ture of the demand side. Given the variety of public policy choices which affect indi-
vidual labor market outcomes, it is not surprising that countries differ in the trends
observed in inequality of individual earnings.18.
Household income depends on household composition (that is, on the processes
determining formation, dissolution and size of households), on the total market in-
come of all household members from capital (which is influenced by inheritance pat-
terns and taxation) as well as from labor, on the transfer incomes for which household
members are eligible and on the household’s treatment by the tax system. Trends in
the inequality of household income depend on changes in all these variables, some of
which are heavily influenced by the public policies of governments, but some of which
depend more on shifts in culture and society (both of which vary by country). National
differences in culture and politics, and the vagaries of the evolution of such differ-
ences, thus have many channels of influence—and no segment of the income distribu-
tion is insulated from the impact of political decisions and public policy.
It is not, therefore, really surprising to find a diversity of national experiences—
as Brandolini puts it: “Neatly defined and unambiguous trends are unlikely to result
from this multiplicity of factors”[1998, 38]. This paper has found a diversity of trends,
both in the aggregate and in the experience of particular birth cohorts, and there is
every reason to expect that diversity to continue.
However, one lesson from the data is how quickly the income distribution can
change—particularly in the tails. Although the prevailing wisdom in the early 1970s
was that studying the income distribution was “like watching grass grow,” because
change was so slow, the period since 1980 has seen real differences emerge in fairly
short order. There has been a substantial increase in inequality and polarization in
the United States and the UK in a 15-year period. In the early 1970s, Canada and
the United States were very similar in income distribution, and both were high-in-
equality countries compared to the UK. By 1994/95, Canada and the United States
were clearly different from each other and the UK had emerged as a relatively high137 LONG RUN TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY
inequality, high poverty country by European standards. Change in Germany and
Sweden was much more muted.
It should not be particularly surprising that the position of the poor can change
quickly. Precisely because they have little to begin with, relatively small real trans-
fers can make a big percentage difference. The poor can benefit a lot (or lose a lot)
from policy changes that make relatively little difference to the more affluent.
 For example, the top decile in the UK experienced a $16,961 increase in real
equivalent income from 1979 to 1995, which was more than twice the total average
income of the bottom twenty percent ($6053 in 1995). The comparable change for the
top decile in the United States from 1979 to 1994 was +$13,362 per person (on a base
of $40,248), an increase that was also more than twice the average level of income of
the bottom twenty percent (who in fact averaged a decline of $668 for each person in
the bottom quintile from 1979 to 1994, ending up with an average income of $5,849.)
Table 6 presents the results of a thought experiment. Suppose that the tax trans-
fer system in the United States and UK had been marginally more redistributive and
ten percent of the gains of the top decile had been transferred to the bottom decile in
those countries. What difference would this transfer have made to poverty? Had the
already affluent shared only 10 percent of their gains (for example about 3 percent of
total income) through the tax/transfer system, the poverty rate in the UK would have
dropped from 13.2 percent to 8.1 percent and the intensity of poverty, as measured by
the SST index, would have more than halved. By any measure, poverty in Britain
would have fallen dramatically from its actual 1995 levels, to levels well below those
of 1979. Since the income gains of the affluent were not quite as dramatic in the
United States as in the UK, and because the United States starts from a much higher
level of poverty, a similar transfer would not be enough to push the poorest ten per-
cent of Americans over the poverty line—but the depth of their poverty would be cut
TABLE 6
Hypothetical Transfer of One Tenth of Top Decile’s Income Gain to
Bottom Decile
Poverty Rate Average Relative SST Index
(Percent) Poverty Gap
UKa
Actual 1979 9.0 0.218 0.038
Actual 1995 13.2 0.259 0.066
Hypothetical 1995 8.1 0.186 0.030
United Statesb
Actual 1979 15.9 0.335 0.102
Actual 1994 18.5 0.360 0.126
Hypothetical 1994 18.5 0.278 0.097
a. UK 1979-1995 Average equivalent income of top decile increased from $26,865 to $43,826 (1994 US $)—
transfer to bottom decile of $1696 per capita simulated.
b. United States 1979-1994 Average equivalent income of top decile increased from $40,248 to $53,610
(1994 US $)—transfer to bottom decile of $1336 per capita simulated.138 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
by about a quarter and the intensity of poverty, as measured by the SST index, would
be somewhat less than in 1979.
The point of this example is not political realism—rather it is to stress the sensi-
tivity of poverty outcomes to shifts in income that are rather small fractions of the
recent income gains of upper income groups. In Table 6, only 10 percent of the income
gains of the top 10 percent are being redistributed—none of their previous income,
and none of the income of the bottom 90 percent, is being touched. A relatively small
change in the tax/transfer system could have entirely forestalled the increase in pov-
erty intensity that actually occurred in these countries. Implicitly, therefore, Table 5
reinforces the potential importance of the politics of income distribution—over and
above any influences of labor market changes.
If one thinks about potential discontent with the distribution of income, the issue
for the United States and the UK is whether or not pressure will arise for the fruits of
growth to be shared. The evidence is fairly clear in these countries that the bottom
deciles of each cohort are not seeing much sign of economic progress, either over their
own lives, or compared to the earlier generation at a similar point in their lives. How-
ever, although the political pressure for change may come from the bottom in the
United States and UK, in Canada and Sweden the more likely locus for political dis-
content is the top of the distribution. The “demonstration effect” of the United States
and the UK has shown how the fruits of growth can be appropriated by the already
affluent—and the envious rich in Canada and Sweden may desire to emulate this
model. Time will tell whether the political process responds with more alacrity to
pressure from the top, or from the bottom, of the income distribution.
NOTES
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errors remaining are my own.
1. This paper’s methodolgy is similar to Osberg [1997]. Smeeding and Sullivan [1998] discuss the rela-
tive income of different birth cohorts in the US, Canada, the UK and Sweden. No attempt is made
here to summarize the literature, which is massive even for a single country—see Beach and Slotsve
[1996], Beach, Slotsve and Vaillancourt [1996], Burbidge, Magee and Robb [1996], Doiron and Barrett
[1994], MacPhail [1996], Picot [1996], and Richardson [1994], for a sample of Canadian studies.
2. Although estimates of the confidence intervals surrounding these point estimates are not presented
here, interested readers can find such estimates (for the population as a whole), as calculated using
a bootstrap methodology, in Osberg and Xu [1999].
3. Disposable income consists of the sum of gross wages and salaries, farm self-employment income,
non-farm self-employment income, cash property income, sick pay, disability pay, social retirement
benefits, child or family allowances, unemployment compensation, maternity pay, military/veteran/
war benefits, other social insurance, means-tested cash benefits, near-cash benefits, private pen-
sions, public sector pensions, alimony or child support, other regular private income, and other cash
benefits; minus mandatory contributions for the self-employed, mandatory employee contribution,
and income tax.139 LONG RUN TRENDS IN INCOME INEQUALITY
4. A set of data tables presenting detailed results for each cohort are available at http://is.dal.ca/~osberg/
home.html. Cohorts are set to approximately fifteen years, with slight variations to fit historic dates
such as the end of war in 1945/46, and the Depression’s onset in 1929/30.
5. In 1973 and 1978 the German data present the age of the respondent in five year intervals which do
not align exactly with cohorts as defined here. The results reported are for the ten year age interval
which is unambiguously within the cohort—e.g. German “baby boomers” in 1973 are those Germans
borne from 1948 to 1957.
6. This paper uses the PPP for Individual Consumption by Households (ICP classification) rather than
GDP PPP. The most recent available is for 1990, which is inflated using the implicit price deflator for
consumption. Sources: OECD 1998 National Accounts. Main Aggregates. Volume 1. 1960-1996 (1.OECD
1.51) price deflators; OECD 1990 Purchasing Power Parities and Real Expenditures EKS Results.
Volume 1. (Table 1.5, Pages 30-31, 1.OECD 23.8 1 v.1).
7. See Phipps and Burton [1995] for estimates of the impact of different sharing assumptions on the
prevalence of child poverty in Canada.
8. Phipps and Garner [1994, 13] argue that if one uses the same methodology for estimating equiva-
lence scales, United States and Canadian results are statistically and practically indistinguishable.
Burkhauser, Smeeding, and Merz [1996] emphasize the differences in incidence and patterns of
poverty implied by alternative equivalence scale methodologies in official use in Germany and the
United States and provide estimates of the sensitivity of the poverty rate in the US and Germany to
alternative scale elasticities. See also Buhmann et al. [1998]; Coulter, Cowell, and Jenkins [1992].
9. Figini notes that “OECD and other two-parameter equivalence scales empirically used show a simi-
larity of results [in measurement of inequality] to one parameter equivalence scales with elasticity
around 0.5” [1998, 2].
10. For further discussion of inequality indices see Osberg [1984] or Jenkins [1991].
11.  See data Appendix, Tables 1a to 1e, available at http://is.dal.ca/~osberg/home.html.
12. To maintain comparability, the discussion focuses on calculations for residents of the former West
Germany. Results for unified Germany are labelled 1994 +DDR.
13. With respect to individual earnings, there is an ongoing debate [Acemoglu, 2001] about whether a
trend to increased dispersion in individual wages emerged in the 1970s or the 1980s in the US.
However, the debate about the dispersion of factor returns needs to be distinguished from assess-
ment of trends in inequality of consumption possibilities.
14. The Theil index can be decomposed [ where Rg = the cohort Theil index and R = the Theil index for
all individuals, ng= number in cohort g, n = Total population, Yg = average income of gth cohort, Y =
average income of all persons] as: R = g((ngYg)/(nY))Rg + (1/n) g(ng(Yg/Y)log(Yg/Y)) . Each cell
entry in Table 2 is the ratio of the first left-hand side term (that is, the weighted average of within
group inequality) to total inequality.
15. See Osberg and Sharpe [2000, Table 104-A]. Kilfoil [1998] compares married couples in 1991 in
Canada, the US, Australia, Finland and Holland and notes that Americans work substantially more
at all points in the family earnings distribution. Standardizing for hours worked, pre-tax household
earnings (in PPP U.S. dollars) are remarkably similar for all except the top quintile.
16. In Canadian data, there is a distinct “spike” in the income distribution of the elderly, which is due to
the fact that many of the elderly have no entitlement to employer pensions and are entirely depen-
dent on the same transfer programs, with the same benefit entitlement rules. The size of this “spike”
in the income distribution data depends on the structure of the old age security system, and is less
noticeable in a more earnings-related system such as that of the United States.
17. Note, however, that because tuition is free and living costs are supported, Swedish income differen-
tials for the university educated are still sufficient to make investment in higher education privately
profitable.
18. For example, in the United States, a widening of the university/high school earnings differential has
been observed, but the same is not true of Canada [Bar-Or et al.1995].140 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
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